# PrestaShop 8.2.9 and 9.2.1: 18 vulnerabilities fixed, what you need to do

> On 9 November 2026, PrestaShop fixed 18 vulnerabilities in versions 8.2.9 and 9.2.1, two of which can be exploited without an account if the install folder is still online. Who is affected, what to check and in which order to act.

Publié le 2026-11-21 par PrestaSecure · https://www.prestasecure.com/en/prestashop-security-blog/prestashop-8-2-9-9-2-1-vulnerabilities-fixed

On 9 November 2026, the PrestaShop security team published 18 security advisories, fixed in versions **8.2.9** and **9.2.1**. Fifteen are rated high severity, three medium. Several also affect versions 1.6 and 1.7, for which no fixed release exists in their own branch.

This article sums up what was fixed, what actually exposes your shop, and what to do, in order.

## Who is affected

- **PrestaShop 9**: every version before 9.2.1.
- **PrestaShop 8**: every version before 8.2.9.
- **PrestaShop 1.7 and 1.6**: affected by most of these vulnerabilities. The advisories give 8.2.9 as the fixed version, which means a major version migration.

Three vulnerabilities only affect PrestaShop 9 (the Admin API and the debug mode of the Performance page).

To give an idea of scale: of the 69 shops running our module, 68 were still on an affected version on 21 November 2026, 35 of them on 1.6 or 1.7.

## The vulnerabilities to deal with first

Some of them can be exploited without any account on your shop, or hit your revenue directly.

### The install folder left on the server

Two advisories concern the installer. If the install folder is still on the server, a visitor without an account can:

- run the installation wizard again, read the database credentials, overwrite the shop configuration or reinstall on top of it with their own administrator account;
- get code executed on the server by forging the installer's session cookie.

Since version 9.2.0, this folder is removed automatically after installation. On version 8 and earlier, it had to be deleted by hand, and sometimes it never was.

### Vouchers and free orders used several times

Two other vulnerabilities come from requests sent at the same moment during checkout:

- a single-use or limited voucher can be redeemed several times, each order getting the full discount;
- a cart with a total of zero can produce several orders.

PrestaShop gives no workaround for these two: only the update fixes them.

### The Webservice

If you use the Webservice (PrestaShop's historical API, often enabled for an ERP, a marketplace or a point-of-sale system), three advisories concern you:

- in a multistore setup, a key restricted to one shop could act on the data of every shop, including changing any customer's email address and password, and so take over their account;
- a key allowed to write attachments could point an attachment to a file outside the intended folder, which anyone could then download, for example the configuration file that holds the database credentials.

### Your customers' data

- Files uploaded by a customer to customise a product (a photo, a document) could be downloaded by someone else who knew the order reference and the file name.
- The customer password reset token was predictable for anyone who knew the customer's id and secure key.

## The vulnerabilities that go through a back-office account

The other vulnerabilities need an employee account. They remain serious: a stolen employee account (phishing, a reused password) or a contractor's account that was never closed is enough. Depending on the account's permissions, they allow code to run on the server, which means taking control of the shop:

- importing a theme or a module (including importing a theme from a web address);
- back-office translations and email translations;
- an SVG file uploaded through the file manager or the logo uploader, which runs code in the session of an administrator who opens it;
- debug mode settings on the Performance page (PrestaShop 9);
- the order creation permission, which allowed existing orders to be modified;
- Admin API clients (PrestaShop 9) that could grant themselves every scope, and whose deactivation did not cut off access.

## What to do, in order

1. **Check your version** in the back office, under Advanced Parameters, then Information.
2. **Check that the install folder is gone** from the root of your shop (the `install` folder, or whatever name it was given). If it is still there, delete it. This takes one minute and closes the two vulnerabilities that need no account.
3. **Update to 8.2.9 or 9.2.1.** Take a full backup of the files and the database first and, if you can, test the update on a copy of the shop with your theme and modules.
4. **Until you update**, apply the measures PrestaShop gives in its advisories:
   - keep the permissions for theme and module import, translations, the file manager and the Performance page for fully trusted employees;
   - review employee accounts and close the ones no longer in use;
   - disable the Webservice if you do not use it, and only give customer and attachment permissions to keys of trusted integrations;
   - on PrestaShop 9, delete an Admin API client or regenerate its secret instead of just disabling it.
5. **If your shop runs 1.6 or 1.7**, there will be no fixed release in your branch. Two options: plan the migration to PrestaShop 8 or 9, or apply fixes adapted to your version in the meantime.

## What PrestaSecure does

The PrestaSecure module compares your shop's version with the published advisories and tells you which ones apply. For most of these vulnerabilities, we have prepared fixes adapted to each branch, 1.6 and 1.7 included, which the module offers to apply. With the Serenity plan, we apply them for you: on 21 November 2026, 926 fixes from this series were in place on 61 shops. The vulnerabilities by branch are listed in our catalogue: [PrestaShop 1.6](/en/prestashop-vulnerabilities/1-6), [1.7](/en/prestashop-vulnerabilities/1-7), [8](/en/prestashop-vulnerabilities/8) and [9](/en/prestashop-vulnerabilities/9).

## Sources

- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-h2q4-7fp7-m5jp: Unauthenticated PHP object injection in the installer session cookie leads to remote code execution](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-h2q4-7fp7-m5jp)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-8rxw-79mh-gmm5: Installer can be re-run without an already-installed check, allowing configuration overwrite](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-8rxw-79mh-gmm5)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-r246-6gw4-pj3p: Cart rule usage limits can be bypassed through a race condition in order validation](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-r246-6gw4-pj3p)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-2676-hc74-gg7v: Duplicate orders can be created from a single cart through a race condition in free-order checkout](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-2676-hc74-gg7v)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-wrmc-gmx5-9hhc: Path traversal in attachments allows file read and deletion outside the download directory](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-wrmc-gmx5-9hhc)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-hjwq-7qvv-qxj4: Webservice API cross-tenant customer takeover via missing record-level shop check](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwq-7qvv-qxj4)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-3f36-4qv4-vfgh: Webservice API multishop scope bypass via id_shop=all / id_shop_group](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-3f36-4qv4-vfgh)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-fg9q-mm4c-h5xc: Unauthenticated disclosure of a customer's customization file upload via order reference (authorization bypass in UploadController)](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-fg9q-mm4c-h5xc)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-g6p7-cx52-hcrj: Predictable password reset token allows a customer account takeover when the customer secure key is known](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-g6p7-cx52-hcrj)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-7q68-ch46-pxmc: Path traversal in theme and module import allows an authenticated administrator to write files outside the intended folder (RCE)](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-7q68-ch46-pxmc)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-95w6-v2wq-cv8w: Remote code execution through the theme "Import from the web" feature (unrestricted file write to the admin directory)](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-95w6-v2wq-cv8w)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-fxq4-2mc8-99pr: Arbitrary file inclusion through the module parameter of the back-office translations page allows code execution](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-fxq4-2mc8-99pr)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-5p6p-mx64-96jf: Path traversal in back-office email translations allows arbitrary file write leading to remote code execution](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-5p6p-mx64-96jf)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-99cp-c6mm-p7h5: Stored XSS through SVG files uploaded with the back-office file manager and logo uploader](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-99cp-c6mm-p7h5)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-95f5-jc9c-gg3q: PHP code injection through the back-office Debug Mode cookie fields allows an employee with only the Performance permissions to execute arbitrary code](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-95f5-jc9c-gg3q)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-mgcf-mrg4-mcxv: Back-office employees with create-only order permission can modify existing orders](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-mgcf-mrg4-mcxv)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-p292-3rh4-vm4p: Admin API client holding api_client_write can grant itself any scope, leading to code execution](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-p292-3rh4-vm4p)
- [PrestaShop advisory GHSA-6c2j-pgwm-95m9: Admin API client disable and access-token revocation are ineffective](https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/security/advisories/GHSA-6c2j-pgwm-95m9)
